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WELLINGTON'S LABORS 
MICHAEL H. Go'ITESMAN* 
I. TEACHING LABOR 
My first class as a student at Yale Law School was the first class 
Harry Wellington taught there. It was the Fall of 1956. The course was 
Contracts. Harry entered the classroom, looking no older than the stu-
dents (in truth, he 'wasn't much older), but surely better dressed. He 
settled himself on the corner of the desk, and the magic began. 
Without introduction or fanfare, Harry embarked on a mono-
logue about a magazine that kept arriving, uninvited, in his mailbox 
each month. He confessed to leafing through the pages from time to 
time, and wondered if this obligated him to pay for it. 
We, of course, presumed to know full well what magazine he was 
talking about. Playboy had begun publication just two years before, 
and leafing through the pages seemed a sensible strategy, at least to 
the 95% of us who were men. We were probably wrong, but our as-
sumption that Playboy was the subject of inquiry fueled our interest, 
and Harry didn't dampen enthusiasm by making full disclosure. 
We discussed Harry's quandary-did he have to pay?-through-
out the course. But we didn't arrive at an answer, and Harry didn't 
proffer one. The joy was in the inquiry, not the answer. Thus did 
Harry whet our appetite for the legal enterprise. 
I was so exhilarated by this experience that when it came time to 
pick courses for our second semester (Yale even then allowed first year 
students to elect one of their Spring courses) my sole interest was find-
ing out "what's Harry teaching?" The answer was "Labor Law," and I 
enrolled. I had no idea what the course was about: I had no union 
members in my background, and no awareness of even meeting a 
union member. The clashes of labor and management had never 
before engaged my interest. But if Harry was teaching, I was taking. 
And so were many of my classmates. 
That course determined my career. I learned that this was a field 
where there were "sides," and I realized, notwithstanding my prior in-
difference, that I was fully committed to one of those sides. What 
* Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center 
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Harry added-what made this field downright irresistible-was intel-
lectual richness. This was not a course, as so many labor law courses 
are, in which the focus is on the strategic use of the law by contending 
economic forces. This was a course in federalism, in separation of 
powers, in legal process, in reconciling a national commitment to com-
petition with a preference for allowing unions to end competition in 
the sale of one of the raw materials of production (that is, labor). To 
pursue a "cause" in so rich an intellectual arena was a calling too good 
to resist. 
In the late '50s, Yale experimented with a "divisional program," in 
which students pursued a "major" during their fourth and fifth semes-
ters of law school. One of the options was a major in Labor Law, and 
many of us chose it. We had the happy experience of avo very differ-
ent mentors: intellectualizing with Harry, real-world strategizing with 
Clyde Summers. The divisional program didn't survive long, but its 
demise surely was not attributable to the labor law division. We all 
loved it! 
We didn't know, of course, that private sector unionization in 
America-then at its zenith, with nearly 40% of private sector workers 
unionized-was about to experience a mammoth free-fall. That began 
in earnest with the increase in global competition in the 1960's, as Eu-
rope and Asia finally rebounded from the devastation of World War II. 
Today, union density in the private sector hovers at about 10%.1 Nor 
did we realize that public sector unionism, then hardly noticeable, would 
soon explode to fill the void. The social activism of the late 1960's 
marked the onset of that phenomenon. 
At all odds, I graduated Yale in 1959, and began a near thirty-year 
career as a union lawyer, riding the escalator down in the private sec-
tor, and up in the public sector. In the first few years, I would proudly 
send copies of my more ambitious briefs to Harry. In each case, I 
would get a polite letter back, saying that he had read the brief with 
interest, although of course he didn't agree with the position I had 
taken. (The "of course" was a bit of a surprise: Harry, the ultimate 
teacher, had not tipped his hand in the classroom as to where he 
stood.) After a while, I took the hint, and stopped sending. But Harry 
was always there as I drafted those briefs: his was the standard of intel-
lectual rigor those briefs had to meet. 
1. See Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Table 3, 
Union Members in 1999 Gan. 19, 2000), available at http://www.bls.gov/news.release/ 
union2.nrO.htm).[hereinafter Union Members]. 
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And, .of CQurse, when I began teaching, fQr a decade as an adjunct, 
and then full-time, my gQal was tQ emulate what I remembered mQst 
fQndly abQut my .own law schQQI career: Harry's teaching. Indeed, I 
even vQlunteered tQ teach CQntracts, SQ that I CQuid cQnfrQnt my stu-
dents with Harry's unsQlicited magazine hypQthetical. SQmehQw, it 
didn't spark the same excitement in my classrQQm. Was it the different 
era, .or just an insufficiency .of magic .on the CQrner .of the desk? 
ll. WRITING ABOUT LABOR 
ThQugh he later went .on tQ becQme an impQrtant cQnstitutiQnal 
schQlar, Harry's early schQlarship was predQminantly abQut lab .or law. 
Between 1955 and 1976, he authQred .or co-authQred three bQQks .on 
lab .or law, and mQre than a dQzen law review articles. There aren't 
many peQple whQ CQuld co-authQr .one bQQk with Ralph Winter and 
anQther with Clyde Summers, yet anQther testament tQ the subtlety 
and disinterestedness .of Harry's intellectual reach. 
Given tQday's predQminance .of public sectQr uniQnism, I want tQ 
recall briefly the bQQk Harry co-authQred with Ralph Winter in 1971, 
The Unions and the Cities. 2 They saw that public emplQyment was the 
emerging gwwth area fQr uniQnizatiQn. In the decade befQre their 
bQQk, the number .of public emplQyees in America had increased mQre 
than 50%3, and the number represented by uniQns had grQwn expo-
nentially tQ nearly tWQ milliQn. As this rise cQincided with the start .of 
the decline in private sectQr uniQnism, public sectQr emplQyees had 
risen in that decade frQm 5% tQ 11 % .of America's uniQnized wQrkers.4 
I wQnder whether WellingtQn and Winter envisiQned hQW enQr-
mQUS WQuld be the future grQwth .of public sectQr uniQnism. TQday, 
there are nearly eight milliQn public emplQyees represented by un-
iQns-fQur times the number when they wrQte their bQQk. Public em-
plQyees nQW cQnstitute 43.6% .of the nearly 18 milliQn uniQn-
represented emplQyees in America, cQmpared tQ 11 % then.5 Despite a 
crazy-quilt .of state laws that regulate public emplQyee uniQnizatiQn, 
uniQn density in the public sectQr has surpassed the peak attained in 
2. See liARRy H. WELLINGTON & RALPH K WINTER,JR., THE UNION AND THE CrrrES 
(1971). 
3. See id. at 33-34. 
4. See WELLINGTON & WINTER, supra note 3, at 34. 
5. See Union Members, supra note 2. Table 3 shows 10,104,000 private wage and 
salary workers represented by unions, and 7,815,000 government workers represented 
by unions. 
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the private sector in the 1950's. Today, 42.1 % of all the public employ-
ees in America are represented by unions.6 
The Unions and the Cities was prompted by what Wellington and 
Winter saw as troubling signs in the public sector: politicians' capitula-
tions, in the face of strike threats, to what they (the authors) thought 
were extravagant union demands. States and cities were then consider-
ing what set of legal rules and institutions would regulate public sector 
collective bargaining, and the authors feared that they would unthink-
ingly adopt those that had long prevailed in the private sector. Their 
book undertook to show that differences in the public sector justified 
radically different legal rules and institutions. 
The Wellington-Winter thesis was rooted in public choice theory, 
although it wasn't called that then. Their central insights can be dis-
cerned by examining their position on two important issues. 
A. Should Public Employees Be Allowed To Strike? 
The right to strike is the centerpiece of national labor policy in 
the private sector. As Justice Brennan explained for the Supreme 
Court, in Insurance Agents v NLRB:7 
[CJollective bargaining ... cannot be equated with an 
academic collective search for truth. . .. The parties ... 
proceed from contrary and to an extent antagonistic view-
points and concepts of self-interest. The system has not 
reached the ideal of the philosophic notion that perfect 
understanding among people would lead to perfect 
agreement among them on values. The presence oj economic 
weapons in reserve, and their actual exercise on occasion by the 
parties, is part and parcel oj the system that the Wagner and 
Taft-Hartley Acts have recognized. . .. [AJ t the present 
statutory stage of our national labor relations policy, the 
two factors - necessity for good-faith bargaining between 
parties, and the availability of economic pressure devices 
to each to make the other party incline to agree on one's 
terms - exist side by side.8 
But Wellington and Winter urged that strikes in public employ-
ment be banned, and their argument for that position diverged radi-
6. See Union Members, supra note 2. 
7. See 361 U.S. 477 (1960). 
8. !d. at 488-89 (emphasis added). 
HeinOnline -- 45 N.Y. L. Sch. L. Rev. 81 2001-2002
2000-2001] WELliNGTON'S LABORS 81 
cally from that of others who then opposed public sector strikes. The 
usual argument advanced for banning such strikes was that public em-
ployees perform vital services that can't be interrupted. But as Wel-
lington and Winter showed, that argument is ultimately unpersuasive, 
and if that ,vas all that could be advanced in opposition, the union's 
quest for a right to strike was likely to carry the day. They recognized 
that some public employees do indeed perform services so vital that 
the public cannot afford their interruption: police and fire are the par-
adigmatic examples. But the case cannot be made that a strike by most 
other categories of public workers-park employees, tax collectors, or 
even teachers-would be more harmful to society than lawful strikes in 
some parts of the private sector (e.g., transportation and basic manu-
facturing industries). 
Wellington and Winter opposed public sector strikes for quite a 
different reason. Public employees, in their quest for higher wages, 
are competing against other citizens with other claims on what is ulti-
mately a limited public fisc. If, alone among the citizen claimants, pub-
lic employees can rely not only on their lobbying power (the weapon 
enjoyed by all claimants) but also their capacity to disrupt public ser-
vices, they will enjoy an inflated arsenal that will give primacy to their 
demands over competing claimants, and the end result may be a so-
cially-undesirable allocation of public resources. This is especially so, 
Wellington and Winter argued, because public officials will be more 
likely to surrender to unreasonable union demands backed by strike 
threats than will their private sector counterparts. Public officials are 
motivated by electoral concerns, not the bottom line. If satisfying 
worker's immediate demands and thus avoiding strikes keeps the pub-
lic happy in the short run, elected officials are unlikely to stand fast 
against union demands and unleash a strike that disrupts public ser-
vices and may rebound to their political disadvantage. They will in-
stead take the short-term expedient route: yield to the union's 
extravagant demands, and visit the ultimate public price for that sur-
render-reduced expenditures on other government services, or in-
creased taxes-in later omnibus bills where the causal role of the 
earlier surrender will be undetectable. 
B. What Should Be the Scope of Bargaining in the Public Sector? 
Wellington and Winter assumed, appropriately on the basis offed-
erallabor law at the time they wrote, that unions in the private sector 
have a right to bargain over every issue that directly affects employees' 
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interests.9 They urged that a narrower stance be adopted in laws regu-
lating public employee bargaining. As they explained, many issues 
that directly affect employees also have larger implications for society 
as a whole. Two examples: should there be public review boards to 
resolve police misconduct claims? Should class size in public schools 
be reduced, and if so by how much? 
Remitting these issues to collective bargaining, they warned, 
would provide unions a forum in which their voices would be heard to 
the exclusion of other citizens, and in which if bargaining was to suc-
ceed decisions would be reached without a chance for the input of 
others. As a next-best alternative, they argued that if these subjects 
were to be bargainable, the usual procedures for bargaining should be 
changed so that there could be meaningful input by all other inter-
ested citizens before decisions were made. 
Wellington and Winter did not stop with alarms about the right to 
strike and the scope of bargaining. They went on in their book to 
examine every other aspect of private sector labor law, including, for 
example, the shaping of bargaining units and the means for enforcing 
collective bargaining agreements once reached. In virtually every in-
stance, they saw problems with automatic importation to the public 
sector, suggesting instead modifications of private sector doctrine to 
meet their concerns about public sector differences. Their methodol-
ogy throughout was built upon their central premise, reiterated pro-
vocatively in their postscript: 
[T] he principal issue in public employee unionism is the 
distribution of political power among those groups press-
9. Section 8(a) (5) of the National Labor Relations Act requires employers to 
bargain with unions chosen as employees' exclusive bargaining representatives over 
wages, hours, and terms and conditions of employment. At the time they wrote, prevail-
ing Supreme Court decisional law indicated that any matter falling within the broad 
meaning of those terms is a mandatory subject of bargaining. See Fiberboard Paper Prod-
ucts Corp. v NLRB, 379 U.S. 203 (1964) (contracting out of bargaining unit work a 
mandatory subject of bargaining). It was not until a decade after Wellington and Win-
ter wrote their book that the Supreme Court, for the first time, declared that employers 
were not invariably required to bargain over entrepreneurial decisions that directly im-
pacted on terms and conditions of employment, such as closing a plant. See First Na-
tional Maintenance Corp. v NLRB, 452 U.S. 666 (1981). Holding that an employer need 
not bargain over a decision to close part of its business - a decision that may cost many 
employees their jobs - the Court created a presumption against employer obligation to 
bargain over entrepreneurial decisions, which could be overcome only by showing that 
the benefit, for labor-management relations and the collective bargaining process, out-
weighs the burden placed on the conduct of the business. 
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ing claims on government. . .. [It] would seem that every 
responsible union leader must be committed to the pro-
position that what's good for public employees is good for 
the cities, counties, and states of the nation. Our rejec-
tion of that proposition has served as the major normative 
premise of this book. We believe that in the cities, coun-
ties, and states there are other claimants with needs at 
least as pressing as those of the public employees. Such 
claimants can never have the power the unions will vYin if 
we mindlessly import into the public sector all the collec-
tive bargaining practices developed in the private sector. 
Make no mistake about it, government is not just another 
industry.I0 
83 
At this gathering celebrating Harry, I will refrain from propound-
ing my reactions to the book's proposals. Let me just say that I read 
them with interest, although, of course, I didn't agree with them. 
But, in the end, we can all be pleased. The law has developed 
much as Wellington and Winter proposed. Yet, despite these depar-
tures from the private sector legal rules, public sector unionism has 
prospered beyond anything ever achieved in the private sector.H 
Most states forbid strikes by public employees, and the rest impose 
limits on the right to strike that minimize the prospects of its exer-
cise.12 The states vary widely on the scope of mandatory bargaining, 
but, in general, issues of paramount societal interest are not entrusted 
to bargaining and/or are hedged around with safeguards such as Wel-
lington and Winter proposed to assure that other citizens' voices are 
heard before the decision is made. 
It is quite possible that public sector unionism has thrived pre-
cisely because the right to strike is denied. The past two decades have 
sho'wn that the private sector right to strike is a paper tiger, if employ-
ers are prepared to hire permanent replacements for the strikers.13 
The prospect of job loss through striking, and the absence of any other 
mechanism for inducing an employer's submission to a collective bar-
gaining agreement, have rendered unionization futile in most parts of 
10. See WELLINGTON AND WINTER, supra note 3, at 202. 
11. See Union Members, supra note 2. 
12. In the handful of states pennitting strikes, the allowance does not extend to 
jobs deemed too critical such as police and fire, and those who are permitted to strike 
must first run a procedural gauntlet that maximizes the chance that agreement will be 
reached thereby obviating the occasion for striking. 
13. See Michael H. Gottesman, Union Summer: A Reawakened Interest in the Law of 
Labor?, 1996 SUP. CT. REv. 285, 293-96. 
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the private sector.14 But the denial of a strike right in the public sector 
is usually accompanied by the creation of some dispute-resolution 
mechanism for settling the parties' differences: mediation, arbitration, 
or the like. I5 Even where these do not exist, an organized constitu-
ency's lobbying power has proved sufficient to give public employees 
enhanced leverage in competition with the more diffuse, and more 
diffusely represented interests of the larger citizenry. 
I learned legal process theory and public choice theory from 
Harry. That education enabled me to understand why my public sec-
tor union clients prospered in a world of inhospitable legal rules. 
14. [d. 
15. See WELLINGTON & WINTER, supra note 3, at 170 (these alternatives are dis-
cussed therein). 
